Notes: Importance & Challenge of Ethics (Part II)

(Contd from previous post)

III. Cultural & Ethical Subjectivisim

What is Subjectivism?

·         Subjectivism teaches that there are no objective moral truths/ facts out there. Therefore 'murder is wrong' can't be objectively true

·         Many forms of subjectivism go a bit further and teach that moral statements are just factual statements about the attitude the speaker holds on a particular issue. So if I say "Lying is wrong", all I'm doing is telling you that I disapprove of telling lies

·         Some forms of subjectivism generalise this idea to come up with: Moral statements are just factual statements about the attitude normal human beings hold on a particular issue.

·         This may ultimately lead us to this conclusion about moral truths: Moral judgements are dependent on the feelings and attitudes of the persons who think about such things

What is Cultural Relativism?

Cultural relativism is the idea that a person's beliefs, values, and practices should be understood based on that person's own culture, rather than be judged against the criteria of another. Opposite of cultural relativism is ethnocentricism.

Whether Kantian Categorical Imperative is Against Ethical Subjectivism?

·         The categorical imperative of Kantian morality has been crticised for enjoining strict and absolute submission, without any possibility of the least exception.

·         To make matters worse, they had to be motivated by a purely internal drive – not out of love for anyone or anything external to the agent, not even love of one’s country, God, family or friends: it had to be nothing but “duty for duty’s sake”. All this is enough to make any self-respecting antinomian see red, to say the least.

·         Kant was determined that his system of ethics have an autonomous source. Basing mortal conduct on external grounds – the will, of God (Occam) or of positive law (Durkheim) would be to ask for trouble.

·         An atheist would be deprived of any moral foundation and positive law would scarcely help matters: it is susceptible to so many variants, often on the basis of vested interestsand corruption, that it would afford, at best, a very shaky moral set-up.

·         On the other hand, Kant’s  agnostic epistemology, influenced by Hume, rendered it quite impossible to take the “natural law,” based on human nature, as the norm of morality.

·         As the first Critique had argued, we cannot know the ‘thing-in-itself’ (the noumenon) and human nature is one of those things, precisely. The only solution was for him to ground it among those a prior practical principle built into our very mental makeup, parallel to those speculative principles that The Critique of pure Reason has uncovered.

·         These a priori synthetic judgments were endowed with the qualities of strict universality and absolute necessity.

·         But, if one were not to go along with Hume and Kant and accept that not only is there a common human nature in which we all participate, but can discern what basically constitutes it, the problem is dispersed at once:

o   This doesn’t open the door to all manner of cultural exploitation and foisting questionable pre-understandings and perceptions onto recalcitrant people and their cultures.

o   The basic make-up of all humans or “common human nature” would comprise the following data: we are embodied beings with a capacity to transcend space and time, are social by nature, rooted in a world and have some sort of relatedness to the  ultimate: only that and nothing more. No host of uncritical “commonness” are being smuggled in as a kind of packaged deal, forcing people to accept certain attitudes to people, places, things and even God as constituting our “common human nature”.

o   Furthermore, sense perception is a necessary constituent of human nature and this, in itself, opens the door to certain relativism – perceptual relativism. Now this opens the door to a whole range of divergences within and between cultures.

o   If all people are seeing, hearing, smelling and tasting the same objects, they are not necessarily apprehending them in the same way. There is the possibility of “acquired tastes” and some people acquire them, while others don’t. Accepting a common human nature does not oblige us to subscribe to a single, common view of  things, as rigid and unchanging as the Kantian categorical imperatives.

o   Culture is built on sense perception there is plenty of scope for a certain cultural relativism.

o   However, not all cultural differences can be reduced to the mere relativeness of our perception of things. Sometimes it stems from a broader and wider interpretation of whole complexes of interrelated experiences.

o   A particular local, regional or even national customs or rite may imply a judgment that people of a particular gender, ethnic or religious background are either nonpersons or rather inferior version of the species. As a result, they are disqualified from enjoying certain privileges and rights that another dominant group claims exclusively for it.

o   In cases, such as these, where a clear ethical bias is manifest, one has every right to challenge and critique the culture concerned. Cultural divergences, based on a questionable hermeneutics and implying arrant discrimination against certain people cannot justify itself on the grounds of cultural difference.

IV. Morris Ginsberg’s “On the Diversity of Morals”

Ginsberg’s Apparent Ethical Relativism

Professor of Sociology at the University of London from 1929-1954, just one year before his

retirement, Ginsberg delivered the Huxley Memorial lecture on the phenomenon of apparent ethical relativism that anthropologists and sociologists were unearthing in cross cultural studies.

·         He concludes:

o   Amidst variations, moral codes everywhere exhibit striking similarities in essentials.

o   There are no societies without rules of conduct, backed by the general approval of the members.

o   There are none which do not regard that which contributes to the needs and survival of the group as good, none which do not condemn conduct interfering with the satisfaction of common needs and threatening the stability of social relations.

·         He states: “It might be argued that the diversity of moral judgments affords no more proof of their subjectivity than the diversity of judgments regarding matters of fact throws any doubt on the possibility of valid scientific judgments about them.

Ginsberg’s Six Contexts of Variation

·         He then goes on to detail six different contexts wherein a certain variation in moral practices may be noted between and within certain nations and cultures:

1.      Variations in the view as to whom moral rules were held to be applicable.

2.      Variations arising due to differences of opinion as to the non-moral qualities of certain acts and their consequences.

3.      Variations arising from the fact that the same act appears to be seen differently in different situations and contexts.

4.      Variations arising due to a difference of emphasis on different elements comprising moral life.

5.      Variations arising from the possibility of alternative ways of satisfying primary needs.

6.      Variations due to differences of moral insight and general level of development, ethical as well as intellectual.

Range of persons to whom moral rules are held to be applicable

o   Anthropologists like Taylor recognize a certain “natural solidarity,” comprising a measure of mutual forbearance, helpfulness and trust as constitutive of all societies. Everyone felt somehow bound to his or her neighbour by certain societal bonds of shared care and responsibility.

o   However, there was a divergence of view as to who really were ones neighbours. Initially, and quite understandably, “neighbour” was rather narrowly understood to be only those of one’s own family, tribe or clan and very often it was only the males who, in the full sense, were considered moral persons to whom societal norms in all fullness had to be applied.

o   However, what constitutes one’s “neighbourness” is not a particular set of racial features or one’s sex but “human nature adequately considered” and so moral laws have to be applied to all persons, irrespective of their age, sex, social status or nationality.

o   No law was understood as discriminating against ones neighbour: there was only a mistaken perception as to what the term meant.

o   It could well be that vested interest’s made use of this confusion to justify their breaking of promises and agreements to colonised natives. After all, if the natives had no souls, then they were mere sub-humans and the ethical prescriptions didn’t apply in their case.

Differences arising from the growth of knowledge concerning certain acts

o   This is perhaps best exemplified with the medical discovery, in fairly recent times, of the role played by microbes in generating disease.

o   This has given us new  responsibilities as regards cleanliness and hygiene hospital staff may be guilty of criminal neglect if they are careless in these areas nowadays something totally unheard of in ancient period.

o   Again, it was only in the eighteenth century that people desisted from torturing and burning to death alleged “witches.” At that time, such people were seen as being guilty of heinous crimes and, due to their pernicious influence or occult powers could cause serious bodily harm to peoples, bring about natural disasters and  jeopardize not only their own salvation, but of others as well.

o   Happily, we live in more enlightened times and developments in psychology and sociology have helped us recognize the folly and error underlying such views

o   The same act is seen differently in different contexts/cultures: Divergences, here, are very often the result of ethical laws and principles being couched in a very brief formula.

o   As a result, the passage of time or a wholly new set of circumstances in a different climate or culture yield examples of “differences” in ethical behavior as regards the “same” act when, on closer study, we realize that these are totally different ones altogether.

o   What constitutes “usury” in one place may not be so in another, depending on the standard of living. A simplistic condemnation of “aggression” may only apparently be broken in the case of a pre-emptive strike where one nation attacks another because it has reasonable grounds to believe that the other is planning a full scale invasion.

o   In a society where there is no established system of properly conducted law courts, self-redress may be a legitimate option, whereas it would be condemnable wherever there is a working network of judiciary procedures.

Variations due to differences of emphases in moral responsibility

o   Even if there is a universal agreement that we should do what is right and spurn all that is evil, there may be differences of view as to what is the ultimate reason we should do so: it may mean will of God, or love of God, or love of humans, or because of prudence.

o   Sometimes, a particular stress may lead to a certain imbalance if there is no critical reflection accompanying the trend. Irrational feelings of love and devotion may land one in the extremes of fanaticism. An over-stress on faith may lead to a neglect of justice. Self-discipline may wind up in repulsive forms of masochism.

o   It is not so much ethical relativism that is to be blamed for all these oddities, but a lack of the cultivation of a spirit of self-criticism and recta ratio.

Variations due to different ways of fulfilling basic needs

o   This arises when people, though they may be in agreement as to what constitutes the most basic needs of humans (“first order values”), different societies and cultures seek to fulfill them by alternative ways (“second order values”).

o   For instance, most communities favour the monogamous marriage and the sex-rules associated with it: the association of sex with enduring companionship, the fusing of sex with tenderness, the enhancement of the parental relationship through shared interest in the upbringing and love of children, providing security to children by the experience of parent’s love for them and for each other and so on. These are all “first order values” and all cultures recognize these.

o   However, they may seek different ways to realize these ways other than monogamous marriage and its customary practices. Thus, in Bantu society (in Africa), physical attraction, affection and companionship usually follow quite different channels. Instead of seeking these within the context of monogamy, “quite different channels” are followed for each of the above-mentioned “second order values”, “a man desiring his wife, loving his sister and seeking companionship among his male relatives and friends.”

o   This is where there is ample scope for dialogue and exchange, where people of different cultures can challenge each others’ presuppositions and customs, seeking how to more fully and deeply realize the basic goals (“first order values”) that they all respect.

o   In our more enlightened times of freedom of enquiry and dialogue, when we have come to realize that no culture is perfect and infallible and that we have a lot to learn even from those we don’t quite agree with, such exchanges can prove beneficial to all the parties concerned and no one will come away from serious and sincere sharing with quite the same convictions and presuppositions with which he or she entered into it.

Divergences due to the particular level of mental development

The development of mental, and therefore, moral acumen may be gauged, Ginsberg says, from five perspectives:

a.       The degree of universalism that a moral system envisages: this is a matter of assessing whether the moral code stops with the confines of the family, tribe or clan or whether it goes on to include rules governing how one should deal with the larger family, embracing people of all nations, ethnic groups, cultures and religions and making no discrimination according to sex, age or religion;

b.      The range or comprehensiveness of experience embodied in the particular moral code: obviously the moral code of a small group that takes out a kind of nomadic existence by hunting and gathering will be very sensitive to issues linked with rather limited way of life, but it will be lacking as to guidelines for business, economic and inter religious relationships;

c.       The extent to which the underlying moral codes and principles that are the basis of any moral system are brought to light and scrutinized as to how justified they are and whether they have been made to fit together coherently and harmoniously;

d.      The extent to which there is a separation of moral codes from law and from religion: this is important because if no clear demarcation is made, the principles of the dominant religion will be taken as the basis of law and morality and this will imply scant respect, if any, for people who don’t subscribe to the doctrines of the dominant religion: obviously, there should be left scope for individual decision in certain matters and the law should not employ its machinery to oblige everyone to act as if he or she was not in full accord with the teachings of a given religion;

e.       The extent to which moral systems permit, even encourage, self-criticism and self-direction: a system which assumes that even adults are too immature to make their own religious and moral decisions and refuse to tolerate even the mildest form of dissent, even when presented non-violently is certainly inferior to one that assures for a public debate on complex issues and in the light of contemporary development in the social sciences.

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[This notes is prepared primarily on the basis of the IGNOU Study material on Philosophy- Ethics and certain other materials. These notes are provided here for academic reference for students. No copyright to the above is being claimed.]