Monthly Roundup of SSRN Papers on Philosophy: April 2020
Justification by Faith and Good Works: Thomistic Support by Zachary B. Pohlman
Abstract
All Christians hold that grace is a free gift from God, something that man can never earn. St. Thomas Aquinas categorizes God's gift of grace into habitual grace and sanctifying grace; Christians agree the later is necessary for justification. How the process of receiving the sanctifying grace for justification plays out in reality is, however, an ongoing debate.
This paper argues that a sound understanding of the metaphysics of both human will and God's will reveals that, to be justified, some sort of response is required by the human will. This leads to a defense of the Catholic soteriological position of justification by faith and good works. Acknowledging that both Protestants and Catholics rely on the Bible as authoritative on matters of religious truth, this paper cites the Bible as authoritative on such matters.
This paper was awarded the 2016 Rossner Medal at Rockhurst University, an annual award given to the finest philosophy paper of the year at Rockhurst University and is issued by Faculty of the Department of Philosophy.
Euthyphro by Cathal Woods & Ryan Pack
Abstract
Complete modern translation of Plato's Euthyphro.
An Experimental Guide to Vehicles in the Park by Noel Struchiner, Ivar Hannikainen & Guilherme Almeida
Abstract
Prescriptive rules guide human behavior across various domains of community life, including law, morality, and etiquette. What, specifically, are rules in the eyes of their subjects, i.e., those who are expected to abide by them? Over the last sixty years, theorists in the philosophy of law have offered a useful framework with which to consider this question. Some, following H. L. A. Hart, argue that a rule’s text at least sometimes suffices to determine whether the rule itself covers a case. Others, in the spirit of Lon Fuller, believe that there is no way to understand a rule without invoking its purpose — the benevolent ends which it is meant to advance. In this paper we ask whether people associate rules with their textual formulation or their underlying purpose. We find that both text and purpose guide people’s reasoning about the scope of a rule. Overall, a rule’s text more strongly contributed to rule infraction decisions than did its purpose. The balance of these considerations, however, varied across experimental conditions: In conditions favoring a spontaneous judgment, rule interpretation was affected by moral purposes, whereas analytic conditions resulted in a greater adherence to textual interpretations. In sum, our findings suggest that the philosophical debate between textualism and purposivism partly reflects two broader approaches to normative reasoning that vary within and across individuals
Line Drawing in the Dark by Adam J. Kolber
Abstract
The law often requires us to draw lines along a spectrum but offers little or none of the information required to do so effectively. For example, we ask jurors whether reckless conduct reflects the “extreme indifference to the value of human life” that turns manslaughter into murder. Jurors cannot meaningfully draw the line, however, without knowing more, such as the sentencing consequences of drawing the line in some particular location along the recklessness continuum.
Similarly, judges and lawyers cite line drawing precedents from other jurisdictions without considering whether the lines drawn in those cases had the same meaning or consequences as those in the case at bar. And scholars argue about how to classify conduct without making clear what consequences ought to attach once the classification is made, leaving it hard to tell when they have substantive or merely superficial disagreements.
In this essay, I discuss legal line drawing and suggest ways we can add meaning to cutoffs. More generally, I argue, we can “smooth” certain features of the law both to reduce our vulnerability to line drawing problems and improve the fit between the law and what our best theories of law recommend. Even when we cannot easily smooth the law, thinking about the law in a smoother fashion can help reduce the jurisprudential pathologies I describe.
Keywords: line drawing, smooth, bumpy, manslaughter, murder, statutory interpretation, legal discontinuity
Suggested Citation: Kolber, Adam Jason, Line Drawing in the Dark (April 23, 2020). Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3583577
A Today Re-Reading of a Letter Regarding the Noetic Profoundness inside Mihai Eminescu's Antume and Some Other Manuscripts
Nicolae Bulz
Abstract
This study [previously published as a ‘letter’] proposes a thesis: “Mihai Eminescu (Romanian genius, mostly known as poet - 1850-1889) - forerunner of the contemporary Cognitive Studies”.
Also, this study superposes an adjacent thesis: “Mihai Eminescu (1850-1889) - forerunner of the contemporary Noetic Studies” – this adjacent thesis emerges mostly within the context of the publication of this study as a ‘letter’ into the Noetic Journal Vol. 4 No.3 July 2003, pp.268-272.
The proposed thesis is initially based on the significant frequency of the notions: soul (suflet – the Romanian word for the English word ‘soul’ ), light (lumina), mind (minte), thinking (gandire). This significant set of frequencies of these above notions occurs both into the entire antume corpus of Eminescu’s poetry, and harmonically into Eminescu's masterpiece ‘The Lucifer’ (‘Luceafarul’), a poem published in 1883. This poem contains a human and cosmic insight into the Universe; Eminescu's insight appears to us as a presented fairy tale / created within 98 x 4 verses).
The problem of a hard bearing of the Cognitive [and Noetic] insight (nearly done) by a human being may be a contemporary item, too.
A larger insight – may be a contemporary item within a so expected inter/trans/co-disciplinary sensitive and intercultural open society as XXI century that would and must prevail.
This “must” is possible received as a linguistic – but humankind civilization- pattern, inward our contemporary challenge, within our ambivalent legacies and multi-orientated futures. Why not to use Eminescu’s beyond space-time experience, its surprising consonance to us, as a piece of the humankind thesaurus?
Why not to use Eminescu’s experience, its consonance to us – the 2020 humans, as an inquiring piece ‘just’ today – within the global and dramatic fight on the Coronavirus. Could it stand up as a kind of global feed-before [based on ‘local’ diversities] on the current spring 2020 stance of the COVID-19 pandemic – global health drama and mono-disciplinary research on – maybe not only a ‘life-death contest’?
Keywords: Mihai Eminescu, Cognitive Studies, Noetic Studies, Soul, Light, Mind, Thinking, Coronavirus, Covid-19 Pandemic , Life-Death Contest, Inter/trans/co-Disciplinarity, Global Feed-Before, Human And Cosmos Larger Insight
Suggested Citation: Bulz, Nicolae, A Today Re-Reading of a Letter Regarding the Noetic Profoundness inside Mihai Eminescu's Antume and Some Other Manuscripts (April 29, 2003). Noetic Journal Vol. 4 No.3 July 2003, pp.268-272. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3588505
Theories and Laws of Scientific Development
Mario Coccia
Abstract
How does science evolve? This study confronts this problem here by showing different models of scientific development from sociology, philosophy and history of science. Firstly, this paper clarifies the concept of science and scientific research. Secondly, the study proposes different theories that can explain how science and its scientific disciplines develop over the course of time. Thirdly, some relevant laws about the production and evolution of science and scientific fields are presented. Overall, then, this study clarifies, as far as possible, some approaches and characteristics of the evolutionary dynamics of science that can lay a foundation for the development of comprehensive properties to explain the advancement of science and technology in society.
Suggested Citation:
Coccia, Mario, Theories and Laws of Scientific Development (April 5, 2020). Working Paper CocciaLab n. 50/2020, CNR -- National Research Council of Italy.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3568913
Varieties of Ordinary Meaning: Comments on Kevin P. Tobia, 'Testing Ordinary Meaning'
Neal Goldfarb
Abstract
This paper critically examines Kevin Tobia’s forthcoming paper Testing Ordinary Meaning: An Experimental Assessment of What Dictionary Definitions and Linguistic Usage Data Tell Legal Interpreters. Please note that this is a work in progress and that I plan on posting a revised version shortly (for some value of “shortly”).
Although I believe that Tobia’s analysis is problematic in multiple respects, I will focus here on the criticism that I think is most important. That criticism challenges not only Tobia’s conclusions, but also his paper’s central premise.
In particular, I dispute Tobia’s conclusion that the results from his Concept-Condition experiments establish that corpus linguistics is an inaccurate tool. (Those experiments were the ones in which test subjects were asked, e.g., whether a golf cart is a vehicle.) As I will explain, Tobia’s analysis is based on an unexpressed assumption, and if that assumption is invalid, Tobia’s conclusions are invalid, too. The assumption is that in the context of legal interpretation, “ordinary meaning” means only one thing. But that assumption is unfounded.
“Ordinary meaning” is not a technical term in linguistics and to the extent that it has a technical meaning in philosophy of language, I’m unaware of that meaning having had influence on ordinary meaning as a legal concept (which dates back at least to Blackstone). So in its use in connection with the practice of legal interpretation, “ordinary meaning” is a purely legal term. Within that practice, therefore, the meaning of “ordinary meaning” is determined by what the courts say it means and by how they apply the concept in particular cases. And when we look at the caselaw, we can see that there are multiple conceptions of what constitutes ordinary meaning. I will focus here on two of those conceptions (one of which has two subcategories).
The differences between these conceptions of ordinary meaning have practical consequences. The outcome in a given case can depend in part on which conception is invoked (either explicitly or implicitly). Similarly — and crucially — the choice of an appropriate interpretive methodology will vary depending on which conception of ordinary meaning one is assuming. Tobia’s Concept-Condition experiments are suited for use with respect to one of the conceptions that I will discuss but not with respect to the other. And the suitability of corpus linguistics presents essentially the opposite situation: it is suitable with respect to the conception of ordinary meaning for which Tobia’s Concept-Condition methodology is unsuitable, and for the most part unsuitable for the conception for which his methodology is suitable.
This means that to use Tobia’s experimental methodology to evaluate the accuracy of corpus linguistics is to fall prey to a category error. Tobia’s comparison of the corpus-condition results against those for the concept condition proves nothing about the accuracy of corpus linguistics.
Keywords: Legal Interpretation, Corpus Linguistics, Ordinary Meaning, Experimental Jurisprudence, Experimental Philosophy
Suggested Citation: Goldfarb, Neal, Varieties of Ordinary Meaning: Comments on Kevin P. Tobia, 'Testing Ordinary Meaning' (April 3, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3553016
P-Consciousness, A-Consciousness and Freedom (the Function of Consciousness and the Future of Humanity)
Daniel Derome
Abstract
The French version of this paper can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=3525426..
In order to understand how human freedom presents itself, I have proposed to distinguish the space of options that can be chosen, from the decision-making instance that chooses. In the first part of the article, starting with the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenological consciousness, we will look at how consciousness participates in the decision-making instance.
In the second part, after having argued that the function of consciousness is survival, we will integrate another characteristic of human consciousness, joint attention. This will allow us to define the concepts of collective consciousness and collective unconsciousness, with the hope of reducing the latter by improving the former.
Suggested Citation: Derome, Daniel, P-Consciousness, A-Consciousness and Freedom (the Function of Consciousness and the Future of Humanity) (January 24, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3525051 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3525051
Moral Points of View
John Thrasher
Abstract
Modern moral philosophy is divided into three warring factions: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. Although there is considerable variation within each of these groups, they are united in thinking that their approach can answer the basic questions of moral theory. Those questions are, in their simplest forms are “what should I do” (morally) and why? The first is about how one should act and the second is the justification for the answer to the first. Each moral theory gives answers to these basic questions. The problem is that those answers differ, often substantially. Moral theory, because of this, is beset by substantial, sustained, and seemingly irreconcilable disagreement. This is, I argue, because of a background claim embedded in each moral theory that I call the supremacy thesis. This is the view that there can only be one form of an answer to the basic moral questions as supplied by one of the three main moral theories. Recently, Derek Parfit has proposed a conciliatory alternative to the supremacy thesis that he calls the triple-theory. According to Parfit, Kantianism, contractualism, and consequentialism all converge on the same conclusions by “climbing the mountain” of moral theory along different paths. Call this general approach, the convergence thesis about moral theory. Another approach, rejecting both convergence and supremacy is pluralism, the view that there are many, possibly conflicting, answers to the basic moral questions. I argue that both approaches are mistaken and suggest an alternative that attempts to preserve the distinctiveness of each approach to morality, while also arguing for their coexistence. I call this approach the jurisdictional thesis about morality. According to this view, each moral theory answers the basic moral questions from distinct and separate moral points of view and there is no one “point of view of morality,” but rather several that require different versions of the moral questions and different answers. Each point of view, the personal, social, and institutional, defines a particular moral domain or jurisdiction that structures the appropriate answer to basic moral questions. Instead of there being a single moral domain, this view argues that there are several, all of which are important but distinct.
Suggested Citation: Thrasher, John, Moral Points of View (February 26, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3544989
Some Core Issues in African Philosophy
Dominic Abakedi
Abstract
This chapter surveys some of the core issues in African Philosophy such as the problem of the nature of the African intellect; the Tempelsian damage; the question of identity-reference; methodological issues in African philosophy and Worldview relativity.
Suggested Citation:
Abakedi, Dominic, Some Core Issues in African Philosophy (April 22, 2016). Abakedi D. E.,Some Core Issues in African Philosophy. In A Concise Introduction to Philosophy and Logic (Revised) , edited by A F. Uduigwomen and G O. Ozumba, 280-304. Calabar: Jochrisam, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559374
Duty Governing Human Actions: To Act Because It Is Righteous
Sven-Olof Collin
Abstract
It can be claimed that humans have at least three basic instincts: the instincts of selfishness, of belongingness and of duty. Selfishness and belongingness are in focus in economic and sociological studies. Duty has been locked into practical philosophy and, more recently, has been used in organizational justice studies. The paper focuses on duty and explores the instinct of duty by defining it, indicating how it works, and examining its function and origin. This is accomplished by extracting knowledge from a literature review, describing its origin in Kantian moral thinking and extracting some implications of duty, and through case studies analysing the actions of three persons. Duty is found when an individual applies his/her Weltanschauung, containing maxims of action. Duty varies according to the individual, the person with whom the individual is dealing (the ‘exchange person’), the situation and the environment.
Suggested Citation:
Collin, Sven-Olof, Duty Governing Human Actions: To Act Because It Is Righteous (March 24, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3560203 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3560203
Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics
Kevin P. Tobia
Abstract
The personal identity relation is of great interest to philosophers, who often consider fictional scenarios to test what features seem to make persons persist through time. But often real examples of neuroscientific interest also provide important tests of personal identity. One such example is the case of Phineas Gage – or at least the story often told about Phineas Gage. Many cite Gage’s story as an example of severed personal identity; Phineas underwent such a tremendous change that Gage “survived as a different man.” I discuss a recent empirical finding about judgments about this hypothetical. It is not just the magnitude of the change that affects identity judgment; it is also the negative direction of the change. I present an experiment suggesting that direction of change (improvement or deterioration) also affects neuroethical judgments. I conclude we should consider carefully the way in which improvements and deteriorations affect attributions of personal identity. This is particularly important since a number of the most crucial neuroethical decisions involve varieties of cognitive enhancements (improvements) or deteriorations.
Suggested Citation:
Tobia, Kevin P., Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics (January 27, 2016). Tobia, K.P. Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics. Neuroethics 9, 37–43 (2016). DOI:10.1007/s12152-016-9248-9. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3555864
The Ethics of Research That May Disadvantage Others
Christopher T. Robertson
Abstract
In prospective interventional research, a treatment may provide an advantage for the recipient over other humans not receiving it. If the intervention proves successful, the treated are better able to compete for a scarce ventilator, a class grade, or a litigation outcome, potentially risking the deaths, jobs, or incomes of non-treated persons. The concerns for “bystanders” have typically focused on direct harms (e.g., infecting them with a virus), unlike the mere competition for rivalrous goods at issue here.
After broadly scoping this problem, analysis reveals several reasons that such research is typically permissible, notwithstanding the potential setbacks to the interests of non-participants. After considering the almost-dispositive concept of clinical equipoise, insights are gleaned from the harm principle, status quo bias, the levelling-down problem, and a potential bias against prospective interventional research versus program interventions with retrospective study. Consideration of institutional relationships also does not change the analysis that such research is permissible.
Suggested Citation:
Robertson, Christopher T., The Ethics of Research That May Disadvantage Others (April 7, 2020). Ethics & Human Research, Forthcoming 2020; Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 20-14. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3571505 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3571505
Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
Florian Cova, Brent Strickland, James Andow, James R. Beebe, Matteo Colombo, Fiery Cushman,
Brian Earp, Ivar Hannikainen, Joshua Knobe, Edouard Machery, Jonathan Phillips, Jan Sprenger,
Kevin P. Tobia
Suggested Citation:
Steiner-Dillon, James, Is Truth Truth? (March 6, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550212 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3550212
Abstract
All Christians hold that grace is a free gift from God, something that man can never earn. St. Thomas Aquinas categorizes God's gift of grace into habitual grace and sanctifying grace; Christians agree the later is necessary for justification. How the process of receiving the sanctifying grace for justification plays out in reality is, however, an ongoing debate.
This paper argues that a sound understanding of the metaphysics of both human will and God's will reveals that, to be justified, some sort of response is required by the human will. This leads to a defense of the Catholic soteriological position of justification by faith and good works. Acknowledging that both Protestants and Catholics rely on the Bible as authoritative on matters of religious truth, this paper cites the Bible as authoritative on such matters.
This paper was awarded the 2016 Rossner Medal at Rockhurst University, an annual award given to the finest philosophy paper of the year at Rockhurst University and is issued by Faculty of the Department of Philosophy.
Euthyphro by Cathal Woods & Ryan Pack
Abstract
Complete modern translation of Plato's Euthyphro.
An Experimental Guide to Vehicles in the Park by Noel Struchiner, Ivar Hannikainen & Guilherme Almeida
Abstract
Prescriptive rules guide human behavior across various domains of community life, including law, morality, and etiquette. What, specifically, are rules in the eyes of their subjects, i.e., those who are expected to abide by them? Over the last sixty years, theorists in the philosophy of law have offered a useful framework with which to consider this question. Some, following H. L. A. Hart, argue that a rule’s text at least sometimes suffices to determine whether the rule itself covers a case. Others, in the spirit of Lon Fuller, believe that there is no way to understand a rule without invoking its purpose — the benevolent ends which it is meant to advance. In this paper we ask whether people associate rules with their textual formulation or their underlying purpose. We find that both text and purpose guide people’s reasoning about the scope of a rule. Overall, a rule’s text more strongly contributed to rule infraction decisions than did its purpose. The balance of these considerations, however, varied across experimental conditions: In conditions favoring a spontaneous judgment, rule interpretation was affected by moral purposes, whereas analytic conditions resulted in a greater adherence to textual interpretations. In sum, our findings suggest that the philosophical debate between textualism and purposivism partly reflects two broader approaches to normative reasoning that vary within and across individuals
Line Drawing in the Dark by Adam J. Kolber
Abstract
The law often requires us to draw lines along a spectrum but offers little or none of the information required to do so effectively. For example, we ask jurors whether reckless conduct reflects the “extreme indifference to the value of human life” that turns manslaughter into murder. Jurors cannot meaningfully draw the line, however, without knowing more, such as the sentencing consequences of drawing the line in some particular location along the recklessness continuum.
Similarly, judges and lawyers cite line drawing precedents from other jurisdictions without considering whether the lines drawn in those cases had the same meaning or consequences as those in the case at bar. And scholars argue about how to classify conduct without making clear what consequences ought to attach once the classification is made, leaving it hard to tell when they have substantive or merely superficial disagreements.
In this essay, I discuss legal line drawing and suggest ways we can add meaning to cutoffs. More generally, I argue, we can “smooth” certain features of the law both to reduce our vulnerability to line drawing problems and improve the fit between the law and what our best theories of law recommend. Even when we cannot easily smooth the law, thinking about the law in a smoother fashion can help reduce the jurisprudential pathologies I describe.
Keywords: line drawing, smooth, bumpy, manslaughter, murder, statutory interpretation, legal discontinuity
Suggested Citation: Kolber, Adam Jason, Line Drawing in the Dark (April 23, 2020). Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3583577
A Today Re-Reading of a Letter Regarding the Noetic Profoundness inside Mihai Eminescu's Antume and Some Other Manuscripts
Nicolae Bulz
Abstract
This study [previously published as a ‘letter’] proposes a thesis: “Mihai Eminescu (Romanian genius, mostly known as poet - 1850-1889) - forerunner of the contemporary Cognitive Studies”.
Also, this study superposes an adjacent thesis: “Mihai Eminescu (1850-1889) - forerunner of the contemporary Noetic Studies” – this adjacent thesis emerges mostly within the context of the publication of this study as a ‘letter’ into the Noetic Journal Vol. 4 No.3 July 2003, pp.268-272.
The proposed thesis is initially based on the significant frequency of the notions: soul (suflet – the Romanian word for the English word ‘soul’ ), light (lumina), mind (minte), thinking (gandire). This significant set of frequencies of these above notions occurs both into the entire antume corpus of Eminescu’s poetry, and harmonically into Eminescu's masterpiece ‘The Lucifer’ (‘Luceafarul’), a poem published in 1883. This poem contains a human and cosmic insight into the Universe; Eminescu's insight appears to us as a presented fairy tale / created within 98 x 4 verses).
The problem of a hard bearing of the Cognitive [and Noetic] insight (nearly done) by a human being may be a contemporary item, too.
A larger insight – may be a contemporary item within a so expected inter/trans/co-disciplinary sensitive and intercultural open society as XXI century that would and must prevail.
This “must” is possible received as a linguistic – but humankind civilization- pattern, inward our contemporary challenge, within our ambivalent legacies and multi-orientated futures. Why not to use Eminescu’s beyond space-time experience, its surprising consonance to us, as a piece of the humankind thesaurus?
Why not to use Eminescu’s experience, its consonance to us – the 2020 humans, as an inquiring piece ‘just’ today – within the global and dramatic fight on the Coronavirus. Could it stand up as a kind of global feed-before [based on ‘local’ diversities] on the current spring 2020 stance of the COVID-19 pandemic – global health drama and mono-disciplinary research on – maybe not only a ‘life-death contest’?
Keywords: Mihai Eminescu, Cognitive Studies, Noetic Studies, Soul, Light, Mind, Thinking, Coronavirus, Covid-19 Pandemic , Life-Death Contest, Inter/trans/co-Disciplinarity, Global Feed-Before, Human And Cosmos Larger Insight
Suggested Citation: Bulz, Nicolae, A Today Re-Reading of a Letter Regarding the Noetic Profoundness inside Mihai Eminescu's Antume and Some Other Manuscripts (April 29, 2003). Noetic Journal Vol. 4 No.3 July 2003, pp.268-272. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3588505
Theories and Laws of Scientific Development
Mario Coccia
Abstract
How does science evolve? This study confronts this problem here by showing different models of scientific development from sociology, philosophy and history of science. Firstly, this paper clarifies the concept of science and scientific research. Secondly, the study proposes different theories that can explain how science and its scientific disciplines develop over the course of time. Thirdly, some relevant laws about the production and evolution of science and scientific fields are presented. Overall, then, this study clarifies, as far as possible, some approaches and characteristics of the evolutionary dynamics of science that can lay a foundation for the development of comprehensive properties to explain the advancement of science and technology in society.
Suggested Citation:
Coccia, Mario, Theories and Laws of Scientific Development (April 5, 2020). Working Paper CocciaLab n. 50/2020, CNR -- National Research Council of Italy.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3568913
Varieties of Ordinary Meaning: Comments on Kevin P. Tobia, 'Testing Ordinary Meaning'
Neal Goldfarb
Abstract
This paper critically examines Kevin Tobia’s forthcoming paper Testing Ordinary Meaning: An Experimental Assessment of What Dictionary Definitions and Linguistic Usage Data Tell Legal Interpreters. Please note that this is a work in progress and that I plan on posting a revised version shortly (for some value of “shortly”).
Although I believe that Tobia’s analysis is problematic in multiple respects, I will focus here on the criticism that I think is most important. That criticism challenges not only Tobia’s conclusions, but also his paper’s central premise.
In particular, I dispute Tobia’s conclusion that the results from his Concept-Condition experiments establish that corpus linguistics is an inaccurate tool. (Those experiments were the ones in which test subjects were asked, e.g., whether a golf cart is a vehicle.) As I will explain, Tobia’s analysis is based on an unexpressed assumption, and if that assumption is invalid, Tobia’s conclusions are invalid, too. The assumption is that in the context of legal interpretation, “ordinary meaning” means only one thing. But that assumption is unfounded.
“Ordinary meaning” is not a technical term in linguistics and to the extent that it has a technical meaning in philosophy of language, I’m unaware of that meaning having had influence on ordinary meaning as a legal concept (which dates back at least to Blackstone). So in its use in connection with the practice of legal interpretation, “ordinary meaning” is a purely legal term. Within that practice, therefore, the meaning of “ordinary meaning” is determined by what the courts say it means and by how they apply the concept in particular cases. And when we look at the caselaw, we can see that there are multiple conceptions of what constitutes ordinary meaning. I will focus here on two of those conceptions (one of which has two subcategories).
The differences between these conceptions of ordinary meaning have practical consequences. The outcome in a given case can depend in part on which conception is invoked (either explicitly or implicitly). Similarly — and crucially — the choice of an appropriate interpretive methodology will vary depending on which conception of ordinary meaning one is assuming. Tobia’s Concept-Condition experiments are suited for use with respect to one of the conceptions that I will discuss but not with respect to the other. And the suitability of corpus linguistics presents essentially the opposite situation: it is suitable with respect to the conception of ordinary meaning for which Tobia’s Concept-Condition methodology is unsuitable, and for the most part unsuitable for the conception for which his methodology is suitable.
This means that to use Tobia’s experimental methodology to evaluate the accuracy of corpus linguistics is to fall prey to a category error. Tobia’s comparison of the corpus-condition results against those for the concept condition proves nothing about the accuracy of corpus linguistics.
Keywords: Legal Interpretation, Corpus Linguistics, Ordinary Meaning, Experimental Jurisprudence, Experimental Philosophy
Suggested Citation: Goldfarb, Neal, Varieties of Ordinary Meaning: Comments on Kevin P. Tobia, 'Testing Ordinary Meaning' (April 3, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3553016
P-Consciousness, A-Consciousness and Freedom (the Function of Consciousness and the Future of Humanity)
Daniel Derome
Abstract
The French version of this paper can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=3525426..
In order to understand how human freedom presents itself, I have proposed to distinguish the space of options that can be chosen, from the decision-making instance that chooses. In the first part of the article, starting with the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenological consciousness, we will look at how consciousness participates in the decision-making instance.
In the second part, after having argued that the function of consciousness is survival, we will integrate another characteristic of human consciousness, joint attention. This will allow us to define the concepts of collective consciousness and collective unconsciousness, with the hope of reducing the latter by improving the former.
Suggested Citation: Derome, Daniel, P-Consciousness, A-Consciousness and Freedom (the Function of Consciousness and the Future of Humanity) (January 24, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3525051 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3525051
Moral Points of View
John Thrasher
Abstract
Modern moral philosophy is divided into three warring factions: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. Although there is considerable variation within each of these groups, they are united in thinking that their approach can answer the basic questions of moral theory. Those questions are, in their simplest forms are “what should I do” (morally) and why? The first is about how one should act and the second is the justification for the answer to the first. Each moral theory gives answers to these basic questions. The problem is that those answers differ, often substantially. Moral theory, because of this, is beset by substantial, sustained, and seemingly irreconcilable disagreement. This is, I argue, because of a background claim embedded in each moral theory that I call the supremacy thesis. This is the view that there can only be one form of an answer to the basic moral questions as supplied by one of the three main moral theories. Recently, Derek Parfit has proposed a conciliatory alternative to the supremacy thesis that he calls the triple-theory. According to Parfit, Kantianism, contractualism, and consequentialism all converge on the same conclusions by “climbing the mountain” of moral theory along different paths. Call this general approach, the convergence thesis about moral theory. Another approach, rejecting both convergence and supremacy is pluralism, the view that there are many, possibly conflicting, answers to the basic moral questions. I argue that both approaches are mistaken and suggest an alternative that attempts to preserve the distinctiveness of each approach to morality, while also arguing for their coexistence. I call this approach the jurisdictional thesis about morality. According to this view, each moral theory answers the basic moral questions from distinct and separate moral points of view and there is no one “point of view of morality,” but rather several that require different versions of the moral questions and different answers. Each point of view, the personal, social, and institutional, defines a particular moral domain or jurisdiction that structures the appropriate answer to basic moral questions. Instead of there being a single moral domain, this view argues that there are several, all of which are important but distinct.
Suggested Citation: Thrasher, John, Moral Points of View (February 26, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3544989
Some Core Issues in African Philosophy
Dominic Abakedi
Abstract
This chapter surveys some of the core issues in African Philosophy such as the problem of the nature of the African intellect; the Tempelsian damage; the question of identity-reference; methodological issues in African philosophy and Worldview relativity.
Suggested Citation:
Abakedi, Dominic, Some Core Issues in African Philosophy (April 22, 2016). Abakedi D. E.,Some Core Issues in African Philosophy. In A Concise Introduction to Philosophy and Logic (Revised) , edited by A F. Uduigwomen and G O. Ozumba, 280-304. Calabar: Jochrisam, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559374
Duty Governing Human Actions: To Act Because It Is Righteous
Sven-Olof Collin
Abstract
It can be claimed that humans have at least three basic instincts: the instincts of selfishness, of belongingness and of duty. Selfishness and belongingness are in focus in economic and sociological studies. Duty has been locked into practical philosophy and, more recently, has been used in organizational justice studies. The paper focuses on duty and explores the instinct of duty by defining it, indicating how it works, and examining its function and origin. This is accomplished by extracting knowledge from a literature review, describing its origin in Kantian moral thinking and extracting some implications of duty, and through case studies analysing the actions of three persons. Duty is found when an individual applies his/her Weltanschauung, containing maxims of action. Duty varies according to the individual, the person with whom the individual is dealing (the ‘exchange person’), the situation and the environment.
Suggested Citation:
Collin, Sven-Olof, Duty Governing Human Actions: To Act Because It Is Righteous (March 24, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3560203 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3560203
Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics
Kevin P. Tobia
Abstract
The personal identity relation is of great interest to philosophers, who often consider fictional scenarios to test what features seem to make persons persist through time. But often real examples of neuroscientific interest also provide important tests of personal identity. One such example is the case of Phineas Gage – or at least the story often told about Phineas Gage. Many cite Gage’s story as an example of severed personal identity; Phineas underwent such a tremendous change that Gage “survived as a different man.” I discuss a recent empirical finding about judgments about this hypothetical. It is not just the magnitude of the change that affects identity judgment; it is also the negative direction of the change. I present an experiment suggesting that direction of change (improvement or deterioration) also affects neuroethical judgments. I conclude we should consider carefully the way in which improvements and deteriorations affect attributions of personal identity. This is particularly important since a number of the most crucial neuroethical decisions involve varieties of cognitive enhancements (improvements) or deteriorations.
Suggested Citation:
Tobia, Kevin P., Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics (January 27, 2016). Tobia, K.P. Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics. Neuroethics 9, 37–43 (2016). DOI:10.1007/s12152-016-9248-9. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3555864
The Ethics of Research That May Disadvantage Others
Christopher T. Robertson
Abstract
In prospective interventional research, a treatment may provide an advantage for the recipient over other humans not receiving it. If the intervention proves successful, the treated are better able to compete for a scarce ventilator, a class grade, or a litigation outcome, potentially risking the deaths, jobs, or incomes of non-treated persons. The concerns for “bystanders” have typically focused on direct harms (e.g., infecting them with a virus), unlike the mere competition for rivalrous goods at issue here.
After broadly scoping this problem, analysis reveals several reasons that such research is typically permissible, notwithstanding the potential setbacks to the interests of non-participants. After considering the almost-dispositive concept of clinical equipoise, insights are gleaned from the harm principle, status quo bias, the levelling-down problem, and a potential bias against prospective interventional research versus program interventions with retrospective study. Consideration of institutional relationships also does not change the analysis that such research is permissible.
Suggested Citation:
Robertson, Christopher T., The Ethics of Research That May Disadvantage Others (April 7, 2020). Ethics & Human Research, Forthcoming 2020; Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 20-14. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3571505 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3571505
Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy
Florian Cova, Brent Strickland, James Andow, James R. Beebe, Matteo Colombo, Fiery Cushman,
Brian Earp, Ivar Hannikainen, Joshua Knobe, Edouard Machery, Jonathan Phillips, Jan Sprenger,
Kevin P. Tobia
Abstract
Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project (XRP) to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy (osf.io/dvkpr). Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward.
Suggested Citation:
Cova, Florian and Strickland, Brent and Andow, James and Beebe, James R. and Colombo, Matteo and Cushman, Fiery and Earp, Brian and Hannikainen, Ivar and Knobe, Joshua and Machery, Edouard and Phillips, Jonathan and Reuter, Kevin and Sprenger, Jan and Tobia, Kevin P., Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy (June 14, 2018). Cova, F., Strickland, B., Abatista, A. G., Allard, A., Andow, J.,... Zhou, X. (2018). Estimating the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3555417
A Hartian Account of Genuine Theoretical Disagreement
Guha Krishnamurthi
Abstract
In Law’s Empire, Ronald Dworkin raised what he called a new objection to Hart’s positivist theory of law. Dworkin contended that Hartian legal positivism cannot account for the genuine possibility of theoretical disagreement in the law, because, according to the positivists, law reduces to a question about social facts. This means that if there is a question about what the criteria of legal validity are, it must be resolved by answers to empirical questions, like how in fact the officials are acting, and not theoretical questions.
In response, Leiter and Shapiro proffer ways of defusing the problem for the positivist. Leiter questions the face value of theoretical disagreements by showing that the prototypical examples of theoretical disagreement are disingenuous or erroneous. Shapiro shows that the positivist can account for theoretical disagreement, by looking at competing interpretive methodologies, but answering the question this way requires sacrificing the conventionality thesis of Hartian legal positivism.
In this piece, I set forth a new response on behalf of the Hartian legal positivist. Specifically, I contend that the Hartian legal positivist can respond to the problem of theoretical disagreement in a way that both vindicates the face value of theoretical disagreement and maintains its critical commitments, specifically the separability thesis, the social facts thesis, and the conventionality thesis. To do so, I contend that we must attend to the role of inference and the norms of reasoning in legal discourse. Consistent with the Hartian picture, participants in a theoretical disagreement can agree about all the ground facts about the law, but disagree about the grounds of the law because they arrive at their positions by differing legal inferences and reasoning.
Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project (XRP) to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy (osf.io/dvkpr). Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward.
Suggested Citation:
Cova, Florian and Strickland, Brent and Andow, James and Beebe, James R. and Colombo, Matteo and Cushman, Fiery and Earp, Brian and Hannikainen, Ivar and Knobe, Joshua and Machery, Edouard and Phillips, Jonathan and Reuter, Kevin and Sprenger, Jan and Tobia, Kevin P., Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy (June 14, 2018). Cova, F., Strickland, B., Abatista, A. G., Allard, A., Andow, J.,... Zhou, X. (2018). Estimating the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3555417
A Hartian Account of Genuine Theoretical Disagreement
Guha Krishnamurthi
Abstract
In Law’s Empire, Ronald Dworkin raised what he called a new objection to Hart’s positivist theory of law. Dworkin contended that Hartian legal positivism cannot account for the genuine possibility of theoretical disagreement in the law, because, according to the positivists, law reduces to a question about social facts. This means that if there is a question about what the criteria of legal validity are, it must be resolved by answers to empirical questions, like how in fact the officials are acting, and not theoretical questions.
In response, Leiter and Shapiro proffer ways of defusing the problem for the positivist. Leiter questions the face value of theoretical disagreements by showing that the prototypical examples of theoretical disagreement are disingenuous or erroneous. Shapiro shows that the positivist can account for theoretical disagreement, by looking at competing interpretive methodologies, but answering the question this way requires sacrificing the conventionality thesis of Hartian legal positivism.
In this piece, I set forth a new response on behalf of the Hartian legal positivist. Specifically, I contend that the Hartian legal positivist can respond to the problem of theoretical disagreement in a way that both vindicates the face value of theoretical disagreement and maintains its critical commitments, specifically the separability thesis, the social facts thesis, and the conventionality thesis. To do so, I contend that we must attend to the role of inference and the norms of reasoning in legal discourse. Consistent with the Hartian picture, participants in a theoretical disagreement can agree about all the ground facts about the law, but disagree about the grounds of the law because they arrive at their positions by differing legal inferences and reasoning.
Suggested Citation:
Krishnamurthi, Guha, A Hartian Account of Genuine Theoretical Disagreement (March 27, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3562495 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3562495
Historical Materialism and the Concept of Supervenience
Malcolm Rogge
Abstract
The author applies the concept of supervenience in contemporary metaphysics to Marx’s foundational proposition that the relations of production in a society “correspond” to the underlying forces of production. The author proposes that this correspondence relation be regarded as Marxian supervenience. The author draws on Gerald Cohen’s analytical breakdown of Marx’s theory of history and on Jaegwon Kim's formulations of strong and weak supervenience to show how the concept of strong supervenience is most useful for interpreting Marx’s primacy thesis. While no position is advanced here about whether the theory of historical materialism is true or not, the author provides a tool that can be used for developing a clearer conception of Marx’s foundational construct. By employing the concept of Marxian supervenience as an interpretive tool, it might be possible to uncover critical problems or advantages for the theory; it might also be possible to develop a clearer understanding of how to find evidence for the truth or falsity of historical materialism. The results of such efforts could find practical application in the fields of political philosophy, political science, legal science, political history, ethics and sociology.
Suggested Citation:
Rogge, Malcolm, Historical Materialism and the Concept of Supervenience (April 1, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567965 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3567965
Islamic Normative Ethics in the Public Sphere: Maṣlaḥa and the Search for an Overlapping Consensus
Ezieddin Elmahjub
Abstract
This essay shows that the concept of maṣlaḥa (consideration of public interest) is best placed to formulate an Islamic contribution in the search for an overlapping consensus. I argue that maṣlaḥa, as a reason infused source for moral obligation, can develop into a normative construct capable of making positive and intelligible contributions to the secular public sphere. I first determine an access point for religious justifications in political liberalism that recognizes political capacity for Islamic normativity to be present in public deliberations. I take into consideration critical evaluations of the Rawlsian public reason proviso, and propose to adopt Jürgen Habermas’ paradigm of political liberalism as a theoretical point of reference. In particular, I show that maṣlaḥa can operate as a translation device, making Islamic moral positions intelligible to secular moral imagination. Turning back to the content of maṣlaḥa, I argue that its current jurisprudential accounts do not provide a fully-fledged vision of it that is ready to be used in the liberal plural landscape. To develop maṣlaḥa for that role, I propose to position its content within comparative normative discourse, namely consequentialism and deontology. I show that we should not exclusively understand the social good which maṣlaḥa is said to promote in utilitarian terms as per the common perception. Maṣlaḥa can also be understood in deontological terms. Ultimately, a vision of maṣlaḥa can evolve into an Islamic theory of human flourishing encompassing a pluralist normative insights oriented towards promoting what Martha Nussbaum calls human capabilities.
Suggested Citation:
Elmahjub, Ezieddin, Islamic Normative Ethics in the Public Sphere: Maṣlaḥa and the Search for an Overlapping Consensus (November 1, 2019). Australasian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550874
Is Truth Truth?
James R. Steiner-Dillon
Abstract
“Truth isn’t truth,” Rudy Giuliani infamously asserted. Though critiqued as a manifestation of the “alternative facts” mindset in a “post-truth” era, Giuliani’s words, taken in context, embody a practitioner’s insight into several compelling theoretical questions concerning the nature of legal truth and the construction of facts by legal institutions. Does “truth” in the legal context exist only in the mind of the factfinder? Is there a conception of legal truth to which the straightforward assertion of Giuliani’s interlocutor that “truth is truth” can apply? How, if at all, do the idiosyncrasies of legal procedural factfinding require adaptation of conventional theories of truth?
This Article examines the relationship of legal facts—adjudicative facts found by trial courts—to truth. It offers a revised model of legal truth: legal facts are collective propositional constructs capable of bearing a relationship of correspondence to external objects or events they purport to describe.
In developing the revised model, the Article emphasizes the distinctions between the collective epistemic system of the court and the “single-mind” model of individual belief formation. Legal facts constitute collective knowledge insofar as their construction involves necessary contributions from multiple individual minds. Moreover, the formalized processes of the legal epistemic system theoretically mitigate some of the anti-veridical tendencies to which single-mind cognition is susceptible, while creating new obstacles unique to legal factfinding.
The Article then identifies three incompatible conceptions of legal truth, distinguished along the axes of construction and correspondence, which it terms the “naïve positivist,” “radical constructivist,” and “qualified constructivist” conceptions. The Article identifies the qualified constructivist conception as both the most descriptively accurate and theoretically fecund conception of legal truth.
The article then suggests two applications of the revised model’s insights. First, the revised model’s compatibility with correspondence theories of truth permits fine-tuned trading of veridicality of factfinding against other normative objectives. Second, the revised model suggests incorporating a measure of factfinder confidence in legal facts into legal judgments to better account for legal facts’ intrinsic uncertainty.
Krishnamurthi, Guha, A Hartian Account of Genuine Theoretical Disagreement (March 27, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3562495 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3562495
Historical Materialism and the Concept of Supervenience
Malcolm Rogge
Abstract
The author applies the concept of supervenience in contemporary metaphysics to Marx’s foundational proposition that the relations of production in a society “correspond” to the underlying forces of production. The author proposes that this correspondence relation be regarded as Marxian supervenience. The author draws on Gerald Cohen’s analytical breakdown of Marx’s theory of history and on Jaegwon Kim's formulations of strong and weak supervenience to show how the concept of strong supervenience is most useful for interpreting Marx’s primacy thesis. While no position is advanced here about whether the theory of historical materialism is true or not, the author provides a tool that can be used for developing a clearer conception of Marx’s foundational construct. By employing the concept of Marxian supervenience as an interpretive tool, it might be possible to uncover critical problems or advantages for the theory; it might also be possible to develop a clearer understanding of how to find evidence for the truth or falsity of historical materialism. The results of such efforts could find practical application in the fields of political philosophy, political science, legal science, political history, ethics and sociology.
Suggested Citation:
Rogge, Malcolm, Historical Materialism and the Concept of Supervenience (April 1, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567965 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3567965
Islamic Normative Ethics in the Public Sphere: Maṣlaḥa and the Search for an Overlapping Consensus
Ezieddin Elmahjub
Abstract
This essay shows that the concept of maṣlaḥa (consideration of public interest) is best placed to formulate an Islamic contribution in the search for an overlapping consensus. I argue that maṣlaḥa, as a reason infused source for moral obligation, can develop into a normative construct capable of making positive and intelligible contributions to the secular public sphere. I first determine an access point for religious justifications in political liberalism that recognizes political capacity for Islamic normativity to be present in public deliberations. I take into consideration critical evaluations of the Rawlsian public reason proviso, and propose to adopt Jürgen Habermas’ paradigm of political liberalism as a theoretical point of reference. In particular, I show that maṣlaḥa can operate as a translation device, making Islamic moral positions intelligible to secular moral imagination. Turning back to the content of maṣlaḥa, I argue that its current jurisprudential accounts do not provide a fully-fledged vision of it that is ready to be used in the liberal plural landscape. To develop maṣlaḥa for that role, I propose to position its content within comparative normative discourse, namely consequentialism and deontology. I show that we should not exclusively understand the social good which maṣlaḥa is said to promote in utilitarian terms as per the common perception. Maṣlaḥa can also be understood in deontological terms. Ultimately, a vision of maṣlaḥa can evolve into an Islamic theory of human flourishing encompassing a pluralist normative insights oriented towards promoting what Martha Nussbaum calls human capabilities.
Suggested Citation:
Elmahjub, Ezieddin, Islamic Normative Ethics in the Public Sphere: Maṣlaḥa and the Search for an Overlapping Consensus (November 1, 2019). Australasian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550874
Is Truth Truth?
James R. Steiner-Dillon
Abstract
“Truth isn’t truth,” Rudy Giuliani infamously asserted. Though critiqued as a manifestation of the “alternative facts” mindset in a “post-truth” era, Giuliani’s words, taken in context, embody a practitioner’s insight into several compelling theoretical questions concerning the nature of legal truth and the construction of facts by legal institutions. Does “truth” in the legal context exist only in the mind of the factfinder? Is there a conception of legal truth to which the straightforward assertion of Giuliani’s interlocutor that “truth is truth” can apply? How, if at all, do the idiosyncrasies of legal procedural factfinding require adaptation of conventional theories of truth?
This Article examines the relationship of legal facts—adjudicative facts found by trial courts—to truth. It offers a revised model of legal truth: legal facts are collective propositional constructs capable of bearing a relationship of correspondence to external objects or events they purport to describe.
In developing the revised model, the Article emphasizes the distinctions between the collective epistemic system of the court and the “single-mind” model of individual belief formation. Legal facts constitute collective knowledge insofar as their construction involves necessary contributions from multiple individual minds. Moreover, the formalized processes of the legal epistemic system theoretically mitigate some of the anti-veridical tendencies to which single-mind cognition is susceptible, while creating new obstacles unique to legal factfinding.
The Article then identifies three incompatible conceptions of legal truth, distinguished along the axes of construction and correspondence, which it terms the “naïve positivist,” “radical constructivist,” and “qualified constructivist” conceptions. The Article identifies the qualified constructivist conception as both the most descriptively accurate and theoretically fecund conception of legal truth.
The article then suggests two applications of the revised model’s insights. First, the revised model’s compatibility with correspondence theories of truth permits fine-tuned trading of veridicality of factfinding against other normative objectives. Second, the revised model suggests incorporating a measure of factfinder confidence in legal facts into legal judgments to better account for legal facts’ intrinsic uncertainty.
Suggested Citation:
Steiner-Dillon, James, Is Truth Truth? (March 6, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550212 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3550212
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